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THE MEASURE OF THE TRUSTEE'S LIABILITY FOR
IMPROPER INVESTMENTS *
STUART M. WRIGHT t
Periods of financial and industrial depression and dislocation are in-
variably echoed by the revelation of the errors in judgment and the defects
in character of those who in eras of huge dividends and enormous increases
in market values are blindly followed and naively relied on. And true it is
in the case of the trustee: particularly so in this age of the corporate trustee
for whom the affection and friendship of the settlor and beneficiaries of the
trust, present in the older personal trust relation and here wanting, hold no
actuality or hope of a merciful attitude in the time of trouble. Declines in
the capital value of the trust followed by a lessening of the income therefrom
send the cestuis que trust scurrying to counsel with cries for vengeance not
even slightly muffled by feelings of sentiment.
An indispensable background for any discussion of the liability of a
trustee for losses resulting from investments improperly retained or pur-
chased is a statement, here necessarily and designedly general, of the prin-
ciples governing the investment' of the trust estate.
The basic principle is firmly established: a trustee is under a duty to
retain or make only such investments as an intelligent, prudent man would
make in investing his own property having in view primarily the preserva-
tion of the principal and the securing of a permanent and reasonable income.2
*The statement of problems and principles in this article will. in many instances, coin-
cide with the terminology of the TRusTs RESTATEIM. T, Tentative Draft No. 3 (Am. L. Inst.
1,32), in the preparation of which the writer has collaborated as Legal Assistant to the
Reporter, Austin W. Scott. However, the discussion and conclusions are the writer's own.
- A.B., 1925, Brown University; LL. B., 1928, Harvard Law School; member of the
New York Bar.
Every trustee is under a duty to make the trust estate productive of income unless by
the terms of the trust he is directed to retain unproductive property; and if he fails to do so,
he is liable for interest either at the legal rate, or at the rate usually obtainable on trust
investments under the circumstances, simple or compound as the case may be. Howardv. Manning, 65 Ark. -, 44 S. W. 11-26 (1898) ; Jacoway v. Hall, 67 Ark. 340, 5. S. XV.
12 (19oo) ; Regents v. Wilson, 73 Colo. 1, 213 Pac. 131 (1923) ; 2Mades v. Miller, 2 App.
D. C. 455 (1894) ; Elliott v. Baird, 1o2 Kan. 317, i69 Pac. i149 (1918) ; Citizens' Nat. Bank
v. Jefferson, 88 Ky. 6 5, T1 S. XX. 767 (i889) ; Succession of Hawthorne, i58 La. 637, 104
So. 481 (i9.5) ; Estate of Wilson, 97 Neb. 780, i51 N. 'W. 316 (1915) ; Knowlton v. Brad-
ley, x7 N. H. 458 (I8-5) ; Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169 (1882) ; Andrew v. Schmitt, 64
Wis. 664, 26 N. W. i9o (i8S) ; Stafford v. Fiddon, 23 Beav. 386 (Eng. 1857) ; Re Jones,
Jones v. Searle, 49 L. T. (N. s.) 91 (1883); Cann v. Cann, 91 L. T. (x. s.) 770 (1884).
'Foscue v. Lyon, -. Ala. 44o (1876); Citizens 'Nat. Bank v. Jefferson, 88 Ky. 651,
It S. V. 767 (1889); Mattocks v. foulton, 84 Me. 545, 24 At. ioo4 (i892-) ; Harvard
College v. Amory, 2,6 Mass. 446, 9 Pick. 446 (183o) ; Appeal of Dickinson, 152 Mass. 184,
25 N. E. 99 (i89o) ; In re Buhl's Estate, 2i Mich. 124, 171 N. W. 651 (i92-0) ; Kimball
v. Reding, 31 N. H. 352 (1855); King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76 (1869); Cogbill v. Boyd,
77 Va. 450 (1883).
This principle is stated by Woodruff, J., in King v. Talbot, supra at 85, " . the
trustee is bound to employ such diligence and such prudence in the care and management, as
(11o)
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The preservation of the trust estate and not the risking of it in the hope of
increasing its value, is the true policy. The trustee must exercise his own
judgment and use such care and skill as he has in making the investments.
This ordinarily involves investigation as to the safety of the investment
and the probable income to be derived therefrom. 3 He must prudently avoid
placing "all his eggs in one basket" and is required so to diversify his invest-
ments as to minimize the risk of a considerable loss.4 In addition, the trus-
tee must be constantly vigilant in his maintenance of the trust estate.5
The primary principle disclosing the scope of proper trust investment
has in several states been crystalized either by statutory enactment 6 or by
judicial decision,7 so as to limit the trustee to securities of various approved
types. In such jurisdictions the trustee is unsafe in making an investment
outside the prescribed field, for he assumes the risk of any unfortunate result
in treading the uncharted paths. s Even within these designated limits, how-
in general, prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters, employ in their own
like affairs.
"This necessarily excludes all speculation, all investments for an uncertain and doubt-
ful rise in the market, and, of course, everything that does not take into view the nature
and objects of the trust, and the consequences of a mistake in the selection of the invest-
ments to be made.
"It, therefore, does not follow, that, because prudent men may, and often do, conduct
their own affairs with the hope of growing rich, and therein take the hazard of adventures
which they deem hopeful, trustees may do the same; the preservation of the fund, and the
procurement of a just income therefrom, are primary objects of the creation of the trust
itself, and are to be primarily regarded."
' State v. Washburn, 67 Conn. 187, 34 Atl. 1034 (1896) ; In re Buhl's Estate, 211 Mich.
124, 171 N. V. 651 (i92o) ; Listman's Estate, 57 Utah 471, 197 Pac. 596 (1921) ; Burwell
v. Burwell's Guardian, 78 Va. 574 (1884). See Scoville v. Brock, 81 Vt. 405, 70 Atl. 1014
(1908).
'Dickinson. App., 1.52 Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99 (189o) ; Davis, App., 183 Mass. 499, 67
N. E. 604 (1903).
For a modification of the rule of liability in case of an over loan on mortgage security,
see the English Trustee Act, 15 GEo. V, c. ig, §9(1) (1925).
'But it is unnecessary for the trustee to watch the security markets day by day unless
there are indications of trouble elsewhere which would require such attention. Beam v.
Paterson Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 628, 92 Atl. 35i (1914).
'Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wis-
consin, Wyoming. See the statutes in each particular state as to what are authorized in-
vestments. States whose statutes provide only that a trustee shall invest in accordance
with the general principles stated supra, have not been listed. For a digest of statutes
and decisions in all the states see McKINNEY, TRUST INVESTMIENTS (2d ed. 1927).
'Indiana: Tucker v. State, 72 Ind. 242 (i88o) ; Indiana Trust Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ind.
643, 95 N. E. 573 (1911).
Maryland by statute requires a guardian to secure the approval of the court before
investing the ward's estate. MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby. 1924) art. 93, §§ 172-173, 178-179,
251 ; trust companies were later included by art. 11, § 48. An order was issued on Septem-
ber 17, 1923, by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore specifying the types of investments for
trust funds.
Oregon: Boehmer v. Silverstone, 95 Ore. 154, 171, 186 Pac. 26, 3o (1920).
Utah. apparently, requires a fiduciary to secure an order of court for investment of
trust funds to avoid liability for loss. UTAH ComP. LAws (1917) §§ 7723, 7731, 7841-7842:
as to trust companies, § 1207.
WN. VA. CODE (1923) c. 87, § 23. The court may order trust funds to be loaned or
invested.
IClark v. Clark, 167 Ga. I, 144 S. E. 787, 791 (1928); Woodard v. Bird, io5 Tenn.
671, 59 S. W. 143 (i9oo).
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ever, the principle is applicable: the trustee must act intelligently and
prudently.'
The settlor by provision in the trust instrument may specify the limits
of the powers of the trustee in making or retaining investments. They may
be broader or narrower than that prescribed by statute or decision; but in
the absence of a direction requiring a particular investment of the trust
estate, or perhaps authorizing speculation in specific words, the trustee is
still subject to the primary principles governing the investment of the trust
estate.' This may be true despite the inclusion of an exculpatory clause in
the trust instrument relieving the trustee of liability for any losses occurring
from improper investments.:"
The failure of the trustee to act consistently with the principles enun-
ciated above or those principles as rigidified by statutes and decisions or
modified by the terms of the trust, is a breach of trust bringing in its train
personal liability for resultant losses, or perhaps in the case where there is
an exculpatory provision relieving the trustee of liability, the deprivation
or lessening of his remuneration.
This liability of the trustee may arise from his breach of trust in:
(i) selling trust property which he was under a duty to retain; 1
(2) failing to sell trust property which he was under a duty to sell; 13
(3) purchasing property which he was under a duty not to purchase; 14
(4) failing to purchase property which he was under a duty to pur-
chase; 15
or, may arise from a combination of any of these breaches of trust by his:
(5) selling trust property which he was under a duty to retain and
with the proceeds purchasing property which he was under a duty not to
purchase; 16
(6) purchasing property he was under a duty not to purchase and fail-
ing to purchase property he was under a duty to purchase; 17
'Gee v. Womack, 2o3 Ky. 718, -263 S. W. 6 (1924); Gouldey's Estate, .oi Pa. 491,
51 Ati. 315 (902).
Ia Mattocks v. Moulton, supra note 2; Davis, App., .rupra note 4; Matter of Clark, 257
N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (I93); Matter of U. S. Trust Co., i8g App. Div. 7j, r78 N. Y.
Supp. 25 (I919) ; Cridland's Estate, 132 Pa. 479, ig Atl. 36:2 (i8o); Bartol's Estate, 182
Pa. 407, 38 Atl. 5-7 (i897) ; In re Allis' Estate, I23 Wis. 23, io N. V. 36.5 (1904).
'In the following cases the court decreased the trustees' compensation because of a
breach of trust in making improper investments despite the fact that an exculpatory clause
in the trust instrument saved them from liability for the ensuing losses. Warren v. Pazolt,
"oS Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (I9o9) ; It re Chamberlain, 9 N. J. Misc. 809 (i93i).
"TRUsTS RESTATEM.ENTT, Tentative Draft No. 3 (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § i99.
2Ibid. § 20o.
1 Ibid. § mi.
SIbid. §2 02.
'"Ibid. §2o3 (i).
"Ibid. §m23 (2).
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(7) failing to sell property which he was under a duty to sell and failing
to purchase property he was under a duty to purchase with the proceeds of
such a sale. i s
For convenience the first four will be considered by themselves. The
decisions indicate clearly that where there is a single breach falling within
one of these four classes the courts seek to restore the trust fund to the value
it had prior to the commission of the breach, or to place the trust estate in the
same position at the time of the decree that it would have been in had no
breach been committed. Specifically: (i) Where the breach consists of
selling trust property which the trustee is under a duty to retain,19 the trustee
may be (a) charged with the value of the property at the time of the sale
with interest thereon, 20 or (b) charged with its value at the time of the decree
with the income which would have accrued thereon if he had not sold it 21
or required to make specific reparation if this is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, 22 or (c) required to account for the proceeds of the sale.
23
(2) Where the breach consists of failing to sell trust property which the
trustee is under a duty to sell, the trustee may be charged with the amount
which he would have received if he had properly sold the property with
interest thereon.2 4  (3) Where the breach consists of purchasing property
which he was under a duty not to purchase,2 the trustee may be (a) charged
with the amount of the trust fund expended in such purchase with interest
thereon,2 6 or (b) required to account for the property so purchased and in-
"8 lbid. §203 (3).
'Ibid. § 199.'Davis v. Dickerson, 137 Ark. 14, 207 S. W. 436 (igi8) ; Weisel v. Cobb, i8 N. C.
I1, 24 S. E. 782 (1896) ; Feld v. Kantrowitz, 1O2 N. J. Eq. 307, 14o Atl. 426 (1928) ; Bate
v. Scales, 12 Ves. Jr. 402 (i8o6).
McKim v. Hibbard, 142 M ass. 422, 8 N. E. 152 (1886) ; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns.
Ch. 62, 117 (N. Y. 1815); Re Walker, 62 L. T. (N. s.) 449 (i8go); Re Massingberd's Set-
tlement, 63 L. T. (x. s.) 296, aff'g 6o L. T. (N. s.) 620 (1889).
'Draper v. Stone, 71 Me. 175 (i88o) ; Phillipson Y. Gatty, 7 Hare j16 (1848) ; Man-
sell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678, 686 (1732) ; Powlett v. Herbert, I Ves. Jr. 296 (179).
See Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333, 401 (U. S. 1845) ; Hart v. Ten Eyck, supia note 21; Rife
v. Geyer, 59 Pa. 393 (1868) ; Norman's Exrs. v. Cunningham, i Gratt. 63, 72 (Va. 1848).
'Davis v. Dickerson, supra note 2O; In re Oatway 11903] 2 Ch. 356 (but only if the
proceeds can be traced) ; United States v. Carter, 217 U. S. 286, 30 Sup. Ct. 515 (199) ;
United States v. Dunn, 268 U. S. 121, 45 Sup. Ct. 451 (1925) ; Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N. Y.
261, 91 N. E. 582 (igio); Fur & Wool Trading Co. v. Fox, 245 N. Y. 215, 156 N. E. 670
(1927).
" TRusTs RESTATEMENT § 200; Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66
Atl. 1076 (19o7); Villard v. Villard, 219 N. Y. 482, 114 N. E. 789 (1916); Matter of Gar-
,:6n, 256 N. Y. 518 (i931) ; In re Hammersley's Estate, i8o N. Y. Supp. 887 (1920) ; Mat-
ter of Lyall, 212 N. Y. App. Div. 417 (1926).
TRuSTS RESTATE-MENT § 201.
:'Adamson v. Adamson, 266 Fed. 949 (E. D. Pa., 19-o); Martin v. Raborn, Adm'x, 42
Ala. 648 (1868); State v. Washburn, 67 Conn. 187, 34 Atl. 1034 (1896); Zimmerman v.
Fraley, 70 Md. 56I, 17 Atl. 560 (189); semble McLean v. Ladd, 66 Hun 341, 348 (N. Y.
1892), Norris' Appeal, 71 Pa. 1O6 (1872); Murphy-Bolanz Land & Loan Co. v. McKib-
ben, 236 S. ,V. 78 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922).
The purchase may be a proper one except for the fact that the trustee purchased it
from himself individually. In this case, the trustee is liable, in the event of subsequent
loss, to replace the fund expended with interest thereon less whatever income has been
received. In re Long Island Loan & Trust Co. (In rc Garretson), 92 App. Div. i, aff'd
179 N. Y. 520, 71 N. E. 1133 (i9o4) and re-argunent detied; semble Smith v. Howlett, 29
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come received.27  In all of these three situations, as security for the claim
against the trustee, there is given to the person entitled to the appropriate
remedy an equitable lien either upon the proceeds of the improper sale or
upon the property improperly retained or improperly purchased. 28  (4)
Where the breach consists of failing to purchase property which the trustee
was under a duty to purchase, the trustee may be (a) charged with the
value of such property at the time of the decree together with the income
which would have accrued thereon if he had properly purchased it, or (b)
required to purchase such property if it is reasonable in the circumstances
and hold it in trust, paying therefor from the trust estate only so much as
he would have paid had he properly purchased it and to pay to the person
entitled to income any income which would have accrued thereon had he
properly purchased it.29
All of these cases are of comparative ease when the question is one
of the measure of the trustee's liability. The problem becomes more difficult,
however, in a consideration of the last three enumerated classes:
(5) Where the trustee in breach of trust sells trust property which he
is directed to retain and with the proceeds purchases property which he was
under a duty not to purchase,30 he may be (a) charged with the value at
the time of the sale of the property with interest thereon, 31 or (b) charged
with the value at the time of the decree of the property with the income which
would have accrued thereon,3 2 or (c) charged with the amount of the pro-
ceeds of the sale with interest thereon, or (d) required to account for the
N. Y. App. Div. 182 (1898). See Bermingham v. Wilcox, 12o Cal. 467, 52 Pac. 8= (i8w8);
Ackerman v. Emott, 4 Barb. 626, 649 (N. Y. 1848).
"'Boston & Colorado Smelting Co. v. Reed, 23 Colo. 523, 48 Pac. 515 (i g97) ; Eisen-
lohr's Estate, No. I, 2:58 Pa. 431, io2 Atl. 115 (1917); Russell's Executors v. Passmore,
r12 Va. 475, 5o6, io.3 S. E. 652 (I920). If the beneficiary has not elected to affirm the
improper purchase, the trustee may sell the property, being liable for any profit or any
loss, but the trustee will not be liable for any profit which thereafter would have accrued
if he had retained the property. McLean v. Ladd, supra note 26. See In re Patten, 52
L. J. Ch. 787 (1883) ; In re Jenkins & H. E. Randall & Co.'s Contract [1903] 2 Ch. 36z;
Wright v. Morgan [1926] A. C. 788. Should the beneficiary be under an incapacity and
therefore unable to make an election, the court will enforce the remedy in its opinion most
beneficial to the trust estate. Morse v. Hill, 136 Mass. 6o (1883) ; Holcomb v. Holcomb's
Executors, ii N. J. Eq. -81 (1857).
I TRUsTS RESTATEIEExT §§ 199 (2), 200 (2), 201 (2). 'atter of Niles, 113 N. Y. 547,
21 N. E. 687 (i889) ; Mfatter of Maitland, 8I App. Div. 633, aff'd 178 N. Y. 612 (1904) ;
Matter of Ryer, 94 App. Div. 449, aff'd i8o N. Y. 532 (19o5) ; Matter of Lyall, supra note
24; Furniss v. Zimmerman, go N. Y. Misc. 138 (1915); Will of Mendel, 164 Wis. 136,
159 N. W. 8o6 (1916). The beneficiary may reject the purchase, cause the property wrong-
fully purchased to be sold, and in case there is a deficiency hold the trustee liable therefor.
Ferris v. Van Vechten. 73 N. Y. 113 (1878); Murphy-Bolanz Land & Loan Co. v. fc-
Kibben. supra, note 26; Will of Mendel, supra.
' TRUSTS RESTATEM.ExT § 202. Byrchall v. Bradford, 6 M\add. 235 (1822); Pride v.
Fooks, 2 Beav. 430 (1839) ; Bate v. Hooper, i DeG. M. & G. 338 (8.55). Where the trus-
tee is directed to purchase one of several designated securities, but fails to buy any of them,
he is chargeable with the value of the least profitable one with its income or with the prin-
cipal uninvested and interest. Scnble Shepherd v. Mouls, 4 Hare 5o, 503 (1845) ; setable
Robinson v. Robinson, i DeG. M. & G. 247 (85).
TRUSTS REsT.\-TE-MExT § 203 (I).
Martin v. Raborn, Adm'x, 42 Ala. 648 (1868).
'Re Walker, supra note 21.
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property wrongfully purchased,33 or (e) required to make specific reparation
by repurchasing the property which he wrongfully sold if it is reasonable in
the circumstances.3 4
The trustee by the wrongful sale has affirmatively acted in an improper
manner. The wrongful sale fixed the liability of the trustee at that time and
although the property which he was under a duty to retain falls in value more
than the property which he wrongfully purchased, he is chargeable with the
value at the time when he sold it of the property which he improperly sold or
with the amount of the proceeds of the sale, and it is no defense that if he had
retained the original property there would have been a loss. The improper
sale is a breach of trust separate and distinct from the subsequent wrongful
purchase made with the proceeds thereof. The beneficiary is in the fortunate
position of one playing the market with the ultimate facts known.
(6) Where the trustee purchases property which he was under a duty
not to purchase and fails to purchase property which he was under a duty
to purchase,3 i he may be (a) charged with the amount of the trust fund
expended in the purchase with interest thereon, 0 or (b) charged with the
value at the time of the decree of the property purchased, or (c) required
to purchase the property he was under a duty to purchase provided it is
reasonable in the circumstances3 7  In this case the trustee is guilty of two
breaches of trust each of which gives rise to its pertinent liability; and the
fact that the value of the property which the trustee was directed to pur-
chase has fallen below the value of the property he wrongfully purchased,
in no wise affects the measure of his liability for wrongfully purchasing.
The misapplication of the fund constituted a conversion and the trustee's lia-
bility as to it then became fixed. But the trustee has, at the same time, com-
mitted another distinct breach of trust in failing to purchase what he was
directed to purchase and this raises a liability. The trustee has subjected
himself to an election by the beneficiary of the remedy: he may be compelled
to restore the trust estate, or to turn over any profit he has made, or to make
up any profit foregone by his failure to purchase as directed. The bene-
ficiary may "speculate" at the expense of the trustee with the result established
in advance.
(7) Where the trustee fails to sell property which he was under
a duty to sell and fails to purchase property which he was
under a duty to purchase with the proceeds,38 he may be (a) charged
= Martin v. Raborn, Adm'x, supra note 32.
TRUSTS RESTATEMENT § 203 (b); Phillipson v. Gatty, supra note 22; Re Massing-
berd's Settlement, supra note 21.
' TRUSTS RESTATE-mENT § 203 (2).
' Matter of Irwin, 6 Mills 438 (N. Y. i9o8).
'TcSTS RESTATEMENT § 203 (d) and (e). Watts v. Girdlestone, 6 Beav. 188 (1843).
See Robinson v. Robinson, supra note 29, wherein the principle of Watts v. Girdlestone was
approved, but the case overruled because the trustee had a choice of proper investments
(consols or real securities) and it was impossible to determine which he would have made.
I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT § 203 (3).
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with the amount which he would have received if he had properly
sold the property with interest thereon,39  or (b) charged with
the value at the time of the decree of the property which he was under a
duty to purchase together with any income which would have accrued thereon
if he had properly purchased it,4 ° or (c) required to purchase such property
if it is reasonable in the circumstances and hold it in trust, paying therefor
from the trust estate only so much as he would have paid had he properly
purchased it and to pay to the one entitled to income any income which would
have accrued thereon had he properly purchased it. In this situation there
is a complete lack of action from which ensue two breaches of trust either
*of which alone brings upon the erring trustee certain liabilities. In each of
the two cases immediately preceding there was affirmative action which con-
stituted at least one of the breaches of trust involved. Two views as to the
measure of the trustee's liability are possible: First, that the trustee is
chargeable with the value at the time of the decree of the property which he
should have purchased, but he is not chargeable with the amount which he
would have received had he properly sold the property he was under a duty
to sell if that exceeds the value at the time of the decree of the property
which he should have purchased.41 Thus, if the property which the
trustee was directed to purchase has risen in value more than .or
has fallen in value less than the property which he was directed to sell,
the trustee is liable for the difference only. In the converse case, if the
property which the trustee was directed to sell has risen in value more than
or has fallen in value less than the property which he was directed to pur-
chase the trustee is subject to no pecuniary liability, since no loss has resulted
from his failure to comply with the terms of the trust, and no profit would
have resulted from such compliance. This conclusion based merely upon the
fact that the trustee has remained passive when under a duty to act rather
than affirmatively acted in an improper manner, discards any suggestion
of penalty, although it places the beneficiary of the trust in a position at
least as good as that he would have been in had the trustee committed no
breach of trust. It is questionable whether this change in policy can be
justified on so slight a difference in the circumstances. A negligent or wilful
failure to act when under a duty to do so, is not a wrong of sufficiently less
degree than a negligent or wilful affirmative act of wrongful character, to
justify the departure from consistency in the treatment of the trustee in
these otherwise similar predicaments. Particularly is this so when improper
investment is the common fault in each, for the fluctuation of the market can
result in as serious an injury to the interests of the beneficiary in the trustee's
Shepherd v. fouls, supra note 29, at 5o4.
"TRUSTS RESTATEfENT § 203 (f), (g) and (h); Hockley v. Bantock, i Russ. 141
(xS6).
4 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT § 203 (f) adopts this view.
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improper failure to sell and buy as in the trustee's wrongful purchase and
failure to purchase or in the trustee's wrongful sale and purchase.
Second, that there is a breach of trust when the trustee fails to sell the
property he was under a duty to sell and if it is to the beneficiary's benefit
to have the value of the property at the time of the breach he may have it.
Any changes in value thereafter occurring are only additional factors which
may be of advantage to him but can be of no avail in reducing the trustee's
liability for this breach. They may, however, increase it for there has been
a second breach in failing to buy property the value of which may rise to a
point greater than the value at the time he should have sold it, of the property
which it was his duty to sell but did not. This second view is apparently
the accepted one,4 2 and is another illustration of a case where the beneficiary
may gamble with loaded dice at the trustee's expense. The rule is based
primarily u1pon a punitive and preventive theory of remedy for breach of
trust. Its application is justified in the case of the inexcusably and negli-
gently inactive trustee who employs no vigilance or business acumen in the
management of the trust estate; but in the case of the mistaken though
honest and diligent trustee, the results may well be so inequitable and impose
such great hardship that the less severe rule will be adopted of permitting
the beneficiary to affirm the whole situation by charging the trustee with the
value at the time of the decree of the property improperly retained, or with
the value of the property which he was under a duty to purchase and did not;
thus saving the beneficiary from any possible loss and at the same time
visiting no penalty upon the erring but honest trustee.
Thus far the situations which give rise to liabilities of the trustee,
with only an incidental indication of the measure of the trustee's liability
in the simple cases have been considered. As fully important a problem is
the measure of the trustee's liability. For the purpose of the following dis-
cussion the cases will be divided into two classes:
(i) The trustee may with separate portions of the trust property
commit separate and distinct breaches of trust: for example, he may im-
properly sell at different times various securities which he had been directed
to retain, or conversely, improperly purchase with separate portions of the
trust property, securities which he was under a duty not to purchase;
(2) The trustee may improperly sell trust property which he had been
directed to retain and with the proceeds of the sale purchased property which
he was under a duty not to purchase and so continue by successive dealings
with the same property and its proceeds a series of improper transactions.
'In a recent conference with a judge of the New York Surrogates' Court the writer
was informed that in trust accountings this was the theory proceeded upon there.
See UNDERnILL, LAW oF TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (8th ed. 1926), art. go, par. (i) (a),
Pp. 470-473.
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For convenience the former will be termed the "horizontal", and the latter
the "vertical", case.
In the horizontal case the problem both on the authorities and on prin-
ciple is not difficult. If a profit has been realized as a result of each breach
of trust, the trust estate is entitled to the aggregate profit. If a loss has
been suffered as the result of each breach of trust, the trust estate is entitled
to be reimbursed the aggregate loss with interest thereon. At once, how-
ever, there confronts us the possibility and the very real probability that
from one breach there will result a profit and from another breach there
will result a loss. The decided cases clearly and definitely indicate that the
trustee's liability will be measured by the amount of the profit made on the
one transaction plus the amount of the loss with interest, suffered on the
other transaction: that there can be no set-off of loss against profit or profit
against loss."^ For example, A is trustee of $50,ooo for B. By statutory
provision A is required to invest the money in bonds. A invests $25,000
in shares of the X Company and $_25,ooo in shares of the Y Company. The
shares of the X Company double in value and A sells them for $5o,ooo, and
the shares of the Y Company become valueless. A is not only liable' for
$25,000 with interest, for the breach of trust in purchasing the Y Company
shares, but is accountable for the $5o,ooo, the proceeds of the shares of the
X Company.
The result is similar if the trustee improperly retains several securities
which he originally received from the settlor as a part of the trust estate,
and some of them appreciate and some depreciate in value: he is liable for
the amount of the depreciation with interest thereon and must account for
the amount of the appreciation. It can make no difference in any of these
horizontal situations that the profitable transaction may not have been a
breach of trust: a fortiori the losses from improper investments may not be
reduced by the profits from proper ones.
44
The principle as applied to these and analogous circumstances is sound
from a theoretical as well as a practical standpoint. It falls in readily with
the accepted idea that the beneficiary has an election to affirm or reject the
act-ion of the trustee in case of a breach of trust:
"The rule is perfectly well settled, that a cestui que trust is at lib-
erty to elect to approve an unauthorized investment, and enjoy its profits,
or to reject it at his option; and I perceive no reason for saying, that
where the trustee has divided the funds into parts and made separate
'TRUSTs RESTATEMENT § 204 (a). Creed v. McAleer, r75 N. E. 761 (Mass. 1931);
Gillespie v. Brooks 2 Redf. Surr. 349 (N. Y. 1876); senible King v. Talbot, supra note
2; Cuyler's Estate, 5 Pa. D. & C. 317 (iz4); Adye v. Feuilleteau, 3 Swanst. 84n,
s. C. I Cox 24 (1783); Ex parte Lewis, i G1. & J. 69 (i819); Robinson v. Robinson, ii
Beav. 371, rev'd on another point, r DeG. M. & G. 247 (1848); Wiles v. Gresham, 2 Drew.
258, aff'd on other grounds, 5 DeG. M. & G. 770 (1854) ; In re Deare, ii T. L. R. i83
(i895); In re Barker, 77 L. T. (N. s.) 712 (i898).
"TRUSTS RESTATEMENT § 204 (b).
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investments, the cestui que trust is not at liberty on equitable as well as
legal grounds, to approve and adopt such as he thinks it for his interest
to approve. The money invested is his money; and in respect to each
and every dollar it seems to me, he has an unqualified right to follow it,
and claim the fruits of his investment, and that the trustee cannot deny
it. The fact, that the trustee has made other investments of other
parts of the fund, which the cestui que trust is not bound to approve,
and disaffirms, cannot, I think, affect the power. For example, sup-
pose, in the present case, the cestui que trust, on delivery to him of all
the securities and bonds in which his legacy had appeared invested, had
declared: although these investments are improperly made, not in
accordance with the intent of the testator, nor in the due performance
of your duty, I waive all objection on that account, except as to the
stock of the Saratoga and Washington Railroad Company. That, I
reject and return to you. Is it doubtful, that his position must be
sustained ?" 45
Practically the rule has a restraining influence on the trustee tempted
to speculate in the hope of increasing the principal of the trust through im-
proper investment since all the risk is thrown upon him in the case of loss
from a particular investment regardless of any benefit which may accrue
to the trust estate as a whole from his policy.4 G An incidental result of this
rule in practice has been unfortunate. Where a trustee who has improperly
purchased property though acting innocently and in good faith, discovers
his error after a depreciation in the value of the property has occurred, there
is no incentive to return to the paths of righteousness since should he rid
himself of the improper investment and secure a proper one, his liability
is fixed by the sale of the property which he had wrongfully purchased and
any profit realized on the newly acquired property belongs to the trust estate
and will not reduce his liability.
Thus far the horizontal case has been considered; but the principle
denying a set-off of profits and losses is applicable alike to the vertical case.
'King v. Talbot, supra note 2, at 90.
" ".s. . if any profits are made, he must account for them; if any loss happens, he
must bear it; and it does not alter the case that the executor has improved the estate by
loaning money on personal security; for the Court will not consider the whole account
of his dealings together, but must consider every single transaction by itself." Adye v.
Feuilleteau, supra note 43. at 87n.
One case refuses to hold a trustee liable for a small loss, who Pursued a general policy
of retaining investments of the testator. Estate of Porter, .5 N. Y. Misc. 274 (1893). But
the difficulty met in upholding this case on the theory that the trustee has (i) retained
the shares received from the testator (2) which were of the same type (3) in pursuance
of a general policy of investment (4) to the ultimate net gain of the trust estate, is that
had the trustee acted properly with regard to all the securities and converted them all into
legal investments but one, and suffered a loss on that alone while making a profit on the
remainder, he would be liable for the loss on the wrongfully retained investment. In other
words, the less evil he does the greater his liability. This is an unsound result.
It is believed that the true explanation of this case lies in the fact that the only objec-
tant to the trustee's account was the special guardian of an infant and that that was only
a technical one, since all adult Parties with similar interests were silent.
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For example, A bequeaths $io,ooo to B in trust for C. In breach of trust
B invests the money in the purchase of shares of stock. He sells the
shares for $1S,ooo and invests the proceeds in bonds which are a proper
trust investment. Subsequently B sells these bonds for $iS,OOO and with the
proceeds and in breach of trust purchases shares of stock of a speculative
type. Thereafter he sells out for $i2,oo. B is liable for the loss of $3000
and is accountable for the $I2,OOO. Similarly, no diminution of liability
by way of a set-off is permitted if the trustee B in this illustration first
suffers a loss through improper investment, then invests the proceeds properly
and subsequently sells the proper trust investment and invests the proceeds
in speculative stocks from which a profit is realized.
47
It becomes apparent from these illustrations of both the horizontal and
vertical cases that the controlling factor in determining the measure of the
trustee's liability is the commission by the trustee of separate and distinct
breaches of trust. The general principle can thus be stated: A trustee who
has committed one breach of trust and is liable for a loss occasioned thereby
cannot reduce the amount of his liability by deducting therefrom the amQunt
of a gain which. has accrued fromi a second and distinct breach of trust com-
mitted by him."8
The principle, simple enough in statement, raises the extremely difficult
problem in application of determining whether or not there are separate
and distinct breaches of trust in the particular case. A consideration of
factual situations will be most helpful in separating the chaff from the wheat
among the elements which determine the presence of separate and distinct
breaches of trust:
A trustee, A, in breach of trust retained ioo shares of sto&k of the X
Company worth $ioo per share and the shares rise in value to $200 per
share. A then sells as many of the shares as he is able, and succeeds in
selling So shares at a large profit; but the 2o remaining shares he is unable
to sell until the price has fallen to $3o per share so that he incurs a loss
as to these. On the one hand it is arguable that here there is a single breach
as to the stock of the X Company from which there is a net profit determined
by deducting the loss on the 2o shares from the profit on the So shares
and that A is accountable only for this. On the other hand, had there been
So shares of stock of the X Company and 20 shares of stock of the Y
7 TRusrs RESTATEMENT § 204 (C).
I 'bid. §2--04.
The Master of the Rolls in Robinson v. Robinson, supra note 43. at 375, stated the
rule as follows: "The question is, whether, where there are several distinct transactions.
in some of which a loss has been incurred, for which the trustees are chargeable, and on
others there has been a gain, which the trustee has no right to claim for his own benefit,
the court will set off the one against the other. I could not enable a trustee thus to repay
himself for the losses which he has sustained, without giving him the benefit acquired from
a fortunate but improper investment of the trust fund. I have no authority to do that that
I am aware of."
See also cases cited supra note 43.
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Company, each share of stock of both companies worth $ioo per share
originally, and the shares of the X Company had risen to $2oo and the
shares of the Y Company fallen to $5o, A would have been accountable for
the profit on one and the loss on the other. The fact that the shares are
shares of stock in the same company is of slight moment in determining
whether there is a breach or several distinct breaches in the retention thereof
by the trustee. A share of stock is a unit with a unit value. It is for con-
venience only that the aggregate of the breaches as to the units uniformly
handled is termed a breach." This it seems is the important consideration:
if the trustee in violation of his duty is dealing with fungible units, the fact
that he deals with a group of them does not the less make it a breach as to
each unit; and the resulting profit on some cannot be offset against the conse-
quent loss on others.
The accidental factor that the trustee in breach of trust retained or
purchased at the same time certain shares of stock should be of little im-
portance in determining whether or not there are separate and distinct
breaches. For example, should A in breach of trust have purchased 8o
shares of the X Company stock on February I, 1929, for $ioo per share
and sold them on May I, 1929, for $2oo per share; and then on June 30,
1929, again in breach of trust and with another portion of the trust property,
purchased 2o shares of the same company for $ioo per share and on Novem-
ber I, 1929, sold them for $5o per share; there is little doubt that the
general principle would apply and A would be accountable for the profit
made on the 8o shares and the loss incurred on the 2o shares. To make the
time element controlling in the determination of the amount for which the
trustee is liable, is unconvincing. 
5
A less difficult problem is presented by the following case: A is trustee
of securities for B. A opens an account with a broker for the purpose.of
speculating for the benefit of the trust estate and in breach of trust deposits
' Nor is it mere sophistry so to reason. The same result can be reached on the basis
of the individual share: each as a unit has been dealt with in breach of trust. This is true
only in the case of fungible units and is not applicable to units which differ from one an-
other in value or otherwise. The trustee may, however, commit a breach as to a unit
which is the aggregate of parts differing from one another. For example: a trustee in
breach of trust purchases a tract of land for $sooo. He sub-divides it into ten lots and
sells four of the lots for S6oo each and the remaining six lots for $4oo each. Here there
is one breach only for the trustee did not purchase a group of lots for a price equal to the
sum total of the value of the individual lots; he purchased the tract for a price. As a re-
sult the trustee is liable for the net loss of $2oo. It is impossible to determine any loss or
profit as to a lot, but only as to the whole tract since its value at the time of purchase
is the only standard to which reference can be made in fixing the amount of the trustee's
liability. It would be otherwise had the trustee in breach of trust purchased a tract of land
consisting of ten acres for Soo per acre and thereafter sold four acres for S6oo each
and the remaining six acres for $4o0 each, assuming of course that the location of the par-
ticular acres did not influence the price but only fluctations in the market value of land
had occurred. In this case the trustee is liable for $800, $2oo being the profit on the sale
of the four acres and $6oo being the loss on the sale of the six acres.
' For other factors useful in determining whether or not breaches of trust are dis-
tinct see TRUSTS RESTATEMiENT § 204 (e).
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bonds worth $ioo,ooo with the broker as margin. A then purchases and
sells through the broker various securities, one lot at a profit of $5000 and
another lot at a loss of $50o0. Ultimately, the original $ioo,ooo in bonds
is returned intact to A, It may be argued that A has committed separate
and distinct breaches of trust in these transactions and made a profit on one
and suffered a loss on the other. The practical difficulty with this stand
is that the trustee may well be subjected to enormous liability in a long series
of transactions, out of all proportion to the risk of loss to the trust estate.
On the other hand, it is more accurately said that the trustee has committed
a single breach of trust resulting in two or more distinct sources of profit and
loss; that the pledging of the bonds worth $ioo.ooo was the sole breach
of trust; that jeopardizing their safety was the true concern of the trustee;
that the trust estate was in no way involved in the fluctuations resulting from
the varying purchases and sales but only in the ultimate liquidation of the
account; that as a result the net profit or net loss o i the account is the measure
of the trustee's liability. 51  The $ioo,ooo in bonds has been dealt with as a
51Ibid. §-w., (i).
English v. MfcIntyre, 29 App. Div. 439, 51 N. Y. Supp. 697 (i8gS), is a case involving
substantially the facts stated in the text. The court in discussing the question of the measure
of the trustee's liability stated at page 447, 51 N. Y. Supp. at 703: "But the plaintiff insists
that he is entitled to an accounting of each particular transaction made by the defendants
upon the direction of Williamson, the trustee, that he may take the profits wherever it appeats
that a single transaction resulted in a profit, without any liability to share in the losses which
may have accrued. Undoubtedly, as is said by Judge Woodruff in the case of King v. Talbot
(40 N. Y. 76), where there has been a misappropriation of trust funds and several separate
and distinct investments have been made, some of which have been profitable and others un-
profitable, the cestui que trust is at liberty to ratify such investments as have been profit-
able and take profits which have accrued from them, and to reject the unprofitable ones,
and as to them insist that he shall receive the money which has been invested in them,
with interest. This rule is well established, and is founded in good sense. (Norris's Ap-
peal, 7r Penn. St. io6; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333; Robinson v. Robinson, iI Beav. 37r.)
But the facts of this case do not bring it within that rule. Here there was no setting apart
of a particular portion of the trust fund and using it to make a particular investment which
resulted in a profit and the setting apart of another portion of the fund for an investment
which resulted in a loss. Whatever may be the theory, there was, as a matter of fact, no
investment, in the true sense of the word, in any property whatever. The trustee might un-
doubtedly at any time have selected any particular alleged purchase of stock or grain, and
required the title to that to be transferred to him, but to enable him to do so it was nec-
essary that he should have paid the full purchase price of the particular property sought
to be transferred, and until he did pay it the defendants were entitled to hold it in their
own name in order to protect their lien upon it for the unpaid portion of the purchase
price. That this was done in the case of any investment does not appear. .... These
investments were not separate and distinct investments, as we have said, but the whole
transaction was simply a series of purchases and sales which, so far as the defendants were
concerned, we must assume were actually made, and which, if they had resulted in a profit,
would have operated to the benefit of the trustee; but which, so far as the trust estate
was concerned, were mere shadowy transactions not at any time affecting its amount or its
nature or the income to which it was entitled, but only rendering it liable to be depleted
at any time if the transaction should result in a loss, or affording a possibility of an in-
crease in the remote probability that the speculator should be able to make profits. The
case is not within the rule laid down in the cases above cited, but it is more like a case
where the trustee has engaged with the trust fund in an unauthorized business, in which
ease the rule is that the cestui que trust may ratify the transactions of the trustee and take
the profits, if there are profits, or he may, at his election, take back the fund and the inter-
est thereon, or the dividends which have accrued from the securities which constituted the
fund, but he cannot take both. If he elects to ratify the action of the trustee, he must take
it not only with the profits, but subject to the losses, but he cannot take the profits on one
part of the transaction and interest on the other, and avoid the losses."
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unit. At no time until the liquidation of the account could there be an in-
crease or diminution in its value which remains intact and unaffected by the
daily fluctuations in the worth of the securities bought and sold for the
account. 52
Similarly if the trustee in breach of trust continues to operate a business
which has been turned over to him by the settlor, there is but one breach
of trust although it may involve two or more distinct sources of profit and
loss. The breach consists of the jeopardizing of the capital invested in the
business and not in the daily transactions incident to the operation of the
business, some of which are concluded at a profit and others at a loss.
The amount of capital invested in the business is the unit. It is risked
in breach of trust. As in the margin account with the broker the effect upon
its value of daily transactions is unapparent. Only on the liquidation of the
business or periodic accounting can its augmentation or diminution be deter-
mined. This is another illustration of a breach of trust pregnant with the
possibility of profit or loss, but not of several breaches of trust. In such a
case the trustee is not liable for the profit on one deal and for the loss on
another; nor, indeed, is he charged with the net profit for one period, and
for the principal of the trust employed in carrying on the business with inter-
est, for another period in which a loss is suffered.5 3 This is a sound result
since the conduct of a business is usually seasonal and the fair standard
for determining profit or loss is not the individual transaction or series
thereof covering a short period.
A contrary view is possible. Where the trustee operates the business
with trust moneys for a time which includes several periods customarily used
as the basis fordetermining whether the business has beenconducted at a profit
or at a loss, he may be held liable not for the net profit or net loss but for
the profit made in one of these periods and for the loss incurred in another. 4
'This may be worked out on the basis of the individual bond: each as a unit in breach
of trust is pledged as security for the margin account; the value of no bond is impaired
by the transactional variations in the values of the securities in the account; only upon
the liquidation of the account can the profit or loss on the improper dealing with the indi-
vidual bond be determined. For convenience the aggregate of the breaches as to bonds
uniformly dealt with is called a breach (see supra note 49).
' TRUSTS RESTATE.MNT § 204 (j). Small's Estate, 144 Pa. 293, 22 Atl. 8o9 (i89I)
Heathcote v. Hulme, I J. & W. 122 (x819).
' This view was not adopted in Small's Estate, supra note 53, though the right was
claimed. It seems it might well be taken, however, since it is the usual business practice
to fix a definite period to determine the profitableness or fruitlessness of a business. Tax
laws are based upon the practice. The setting out upon each new period of speculation with
the trust funds may well be considered a separate and distinct breach.
The force of the holding in Small's Estate is weakened somewhat by the questionable
determination therein that money of the ward loaned by his guardian to a corporation of
good credit and in which the guardian owned a large interest, although unnecessary to the
success of the business and negligible in relation to its capital, was used as a part of the
capital and therefore entitled the ward to elect to take the profits instead of interest.
In Steen v. IHendy, io3 Cal. 15, 36 Pac. o2i (i894), the opposite result was reached.
The court stated at 2.;, 36 Pac. at io24: "Here the position of a trustee is very similar to a
debtor who neglects paying his debts." Contra: Smelting Co. v. Reed, 23 Colo. 523, 48 Pac.
415 (1897).
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Particularly may this election be given the beneficiary in the case where the
trustee has accounted at regular intervals which correspond with such a
period.
In any event, of course, the trustee is liable at the option of the bene-
ficiary for any loss resulting from the breach of trust in failing to dispose
of the business and can be charged with the amount which he would have
received if he had properly sold the business, with interest thereon. 5
A much clearer case of a single breach of trust in respect to property
containing elements of profit and loss, is that of the trustee who improperly
purchases shares of stock upon which the corporation thereafter declares a
stock dividend. For example: A, the trustee, in breach of trust invests
$500o in the purchase of fifty shares of stock at $ioo per share. Soon there-
after the corporation declares a stock dividend of one hundred per cent. A
sells the fifty new shares at $5o a share. He subsequently sells the original
fifty shares at $60 a share. A is liable only for the net profit of $500. Ob-
viously there is but one breach of trust: the purchase of the original fifty
shares. Market fluctuations caused a loss as a result of this breach which
was offset by a greater profit from the sale of the new shares declared as
a dividend by the corporation. Both the loss and the profit are the product
of the wrongful purchase of the original fifty shares.56
One of the most perplexing problems in a discussion of the measure
of a trustee's liability for breach of trust is raised in the case of successive
dealings with a portion of the trust property and its proceeds. If property
is improperly purchased by the trustee and is subsequently sold at a profit,
and the proceeds are used in purchasing other property in breach of trust,
which is thereafter sold at a loss, there are two tenable views as to the
amount for which the trustee is liable: First, he is liable for the profit gained
on the first improper purchase and sale since this was actually in his hands
as trustee and was a part of the trust estate, and that thereafter he risked
trust property in another separate and distinct breach by wrongfully pur-
chasing property which later fell in value, thereby incurring a loss which
perhaps not only reduced or equalled the profit on the former transaction but
encroached on the principal with which the trustee originally set out upon
his speculative course. 57  Second, he is liable only for the net profit or net
loss occurring from the several transactions."8 The trustee has converted a
portion of the trust estate when he risks it in improperly purchasing property
and thereafter his dealings with the property are of no consequence. His
TRUSTS RESTATEEINT § 200 (I). Heathcote v. Hulme, supra note 53.
TRUSTS RESTATEMEN T § 204 (g). This result was reached in the case of issuance of
rights on improperly held stock. Matter of U. S. Trust Co., supra note io.
I TRUSTS RESTATEME.T § 204 (C).
"'Baker v. Disbrow, 3 Redf. Surr. 348, aff'd iS Hun 29, aff'd inem. 79 N. Y. 63z (i88o).
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liability is fixed at the value of the misapplied trust property with interest
thereon, except insofar as the principle of following the rcs will charge him
with the profit he may have, on the property actually obtained. The difficulty
with this latter view is that it fails to give proper weight to the circum-
stance that the trustee has in distinct transactions, each complete in itself, and
carried on at different times, actually realized a profit and suffered a loss.
The only relation between the separate transactions is that there flows through
all some portion at least of the original trust property which was improperly
expended, or its proceeds. There is no indefiniteness in measuring the trus-
tee's liability in this situation for always there is a fixed basis for computing
it on each sale of property improperly purchased, since each transaction is
closed and the amount obtained on the sale can be measured against the
amount expended in its wrongful purchase.59
The converse case of successive dealings, where the first improper pur-
chase and sale results in a loss and the reduced proceeds are again used in
improperly purchasing property which rises in value, of course, lacks the
argument that the trustee is risking not only what remains of the trust prop-
erty originally loosed in the wrongful series of transactions, but is in addi-
tion, risking profits already made which belong to the trust. He is merely
risking a portion of the original amount, supposedly in an attempt to regain
his losses. If he is not permitted to offset any new profit, an incentive to
repair his wrong is wanting. But this consideration is far outweighed, it is
submitted, by the fact that in attempting to reimburse himself (since that is
what it amounts to) he is speculating with property of the trust estate. This
he has no right to do. He should be compelled to bear the loss sustained on
the first purchase and sale regardless of the profit subsequently made. To
admit otherwise, opens a door wide to much wrongful dealing with trust
funds in an effort to reduct justly incurred liability.
The trustee, however, is not liable for the paper profit or loss indicated
by the highest or lowest intermediate value between the time of the purchase
and sale. Although the wrongful purchase necessarily involves a duty to sell
immediately which is violated, the failure to sell is not a separate and distinct
" A third view has been suggested: if the trustee dishonestly intends to and does appro-
priate to his own use a portion of the trust estate, he is not acting on behalf of the trust
estate. Therefore, it is impossible on any theory of trusts to hold him for more than
the net profit or net loss resulting from the series of improper transactions, since in fol-
lowing the res only the ultimate profit could be obtained, and in compelling restoration
of the trust estate only reimbursement for the net loss could be had. Furthermore, no
wrong will justify a court of equity in punishing the trustee for his crime since that is
cared for in the criminal courts.
This view implies and usually is a part of a scheme which includes the application, in
the case of the honest, but mistaken, trustee, of the first view stated in the text. Hence.
the greatest criticism is that it imposes a greater liability on the good than it does on the
wicked, trustee. A court of conscience surely will not adopt such a result based as it is
on such coldly legalistic reasoning. Rather would the principle denying any set off of
losses against gains be employed.
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breach of trust but arises from the same conduct in relation to the same
unit.60 The sale is necessary to fix the measure of his liability.
The case of an exchange of the property improperly purchased for other
property which the trustee was under a duty not to buy is not as clear a
case, at first glance, but it is submitted that the exchange is similar in effect
to a sale in fixing the trustee's liability. The property improperly pur-
chased has an ascertainable market value at the moment of exchange and the
exchange is a definite termination of the trustee's dealing with the property.
Hence, there is present the basis both as to value and time for an accurate
determination of the amount for which the trustee is liable.
The problem of measuring the liability of a trustee for breaches of
trust in the field of investment reduces itself to the problem of determining,
in the myriad combinations of circumstance, what acts or omissions constitute
separate and distinct breaches of trust. The prime factor to be sought dili-
gently is the unit. Determine: (i) Is there more than one unit? (2) Are
there units similar to, or different from, each other? (3) Are the units
uniformly or differently dealt with? (4) Are the results alike or varied?,
Where there is but a unit dealt with in breach of trust, within which
are sources both of profit and of loss there is but one breach of trust, and
the resultant liability of the trustee is for the net profit or loss determined
by setting the one against the other.
Where there are similar units dealt with in breach of trust, there are as
many separate and distinct breaches of trust as there are units, and if, because
they are not handled uniformly, the results are varied, some being profit
and some being loss, there can be no set-off. Where there are units differing
from one another, whether dealt with uniformly or not, if the results are
varied, some being profit and some being loss, there can be no set-off. If.
in either case. the results of the dealing with all the units are similar, being
all profit or all loss, of course, the answer is evident: the trustee must account
for the whole profit and is liable for the whole loss.
Let it not be overlooked, however, in an attempt to correlate, classify
and formulate, that trusts are children of Equity wherein the influence of
many elements, however delicate, may tell in the result. The combination
of factors which singly would not withhold liability, may well do so. The
motive and intention of the trustee, be it evil or good, must always be of
moment and may often be controlling.
' TRUSTs RESTATE-E-T § 204 (k). But if the trustee is under a duty to sell the
property improperly purchased by him, for a reason other than because it was improperly
purchased, as for example where the property became highly speculative, the two breaches
of trust in purchasing and in failing to sell arise from different conduct on his part and
are separate and distinct so that he is liable not only for the original purchase price but
for the value of the property at the time when he should have sold, at the election of the
beneficiary.
